Éditeur(s) : HAL CCSD Springer Verlag
Résumé : International audience
The Condorcet Committee à la Gehrlein (CCG) is a fixed-size subset of candidates such that each of its members defeats in a pairwise contest any candidate outside. The Condorcet Committee à la Fishburn (CCF) is a fixed-size subset of candidates that is preferred to all other subsets of the same size by a majority of voters. In general, these two types of Condorcet committees may not always exist. Kaymak and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 20:477–494, 2003) studied the conditions under which the CCF exists under a large class of extensions of preferences. We focus here on the most important members of their class, the lexicographic extension of preferences, and we define more precisely, the conditions under which these committees coincide when they exist. Our results depart from the rather optimistic conclusions of Kaymak and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 20:477–494, 2003) on the coincidence between the CCG and the CCF. We exhibit profiles for which the CCF is empty while the CCG exists and the preferences are all of lexicographic type. Furthermore, we obtain the same conclusion when we derive preferences on candidates from those on sets of candidates using the separability assumption.
ISSN: 0176-1714

hal-01631176
https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631176
DOI : 10.1007/s00355-017-1079-z

Éditeur(s) : HAL CCSD Economics Bulletin
Résumé : International audience
In this paper, we supplement the results of Kamwa and Merlin (2017) for the selection of a subset of two alternatives out of four by computing the conditional probability of voting situations under which the Condorcet Committee à la Gehrlein (CCG) and the Condorcet Committee à la Fishburn (CCF) may both exist and coincide when voters' preferences on candidates are lexicographically extended on subsets. The CCG is a fixed-size subset of candidates such that each of its members defeats in a pairwise contest any candidate outside. The CCF is a fixed-size subset of candidates that is preferred to all other subsets of the same size by a majority of voters.
ISSN: 1545-2921

hal-01631184
https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631184

Éditeur(s) : HAL CCSD
https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631190

hal-01631190
https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631190

Éditeur(s) : HAL CCSD Elsevier
Résumé : revue électronique. consulter : http://religec.org/pdf/article%20Macdissi%20et%20al%202.pdf
L'existence et la persistance de disparités régionales en matière de chômage sont des problèmes communs à de nombreux pays européens. Dans ce papier, nous analysons les disparités des mécanismes d'ajustement des taux de chômage régionaux de la France à la suite de chocs économiques purement locaux ou nationaux. Les résultats mettent en évidence des disparités significatives dans les caractéristiques des mécanismes d'ajustement dynamiques (vitesse d'ajustement, effet multiplicateur) des taux de chômage régionaux en cas de choc macroéconomique national.
Revue Libanaise de Gestion et d'Economie

halshs-00433078
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00433078
DOI : 10.1016/S1999-7620(09)70009-6

Éditeur(s) : HAL CCSD Editions Dalloz
Résumé : International audience
For a given voting situation, the Strong Borda Paradox occurs when a Condorcet loser exists and is elected. A Condorcet loser is a candidate that loses all his pairwise comparisons. In three-candidate elections, we use an analytical approach to find out, the range of all the scoring rules that can exhibit the Strong Borda Paradox under some well-known preference restrictions and we describe all the scenarios with respect to the rank of the Condorcet loser in the collective rankings. Using the parameterized Barvinok’s algorithm, we provide a simplified representation of the likelihood of the Strong Borda Paradox for the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule (given the size of the electorate) with the impartial and anonymous culture condition for each type of restriction.
ISSN: 0373-2630

hal-01631180
https://hal.univ-antilles.fr/hal-01631180
DOI : 10.3917/redp.273.0375